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WHEN IS A RELIGIOUS BELIEF RELIGIOUS:
UNITED STATES V. SEEGER AND THE
SCOPE OF FREE EXERCISE
Robert L. Rabint
The context and content of a recent Supreme Court opinion construing the
exemption from military service for concientious objectors serves as the
focal point for consideration of the questions of religious freedom inherent
in classifications among systems of religious belief. The author suggests
that limitations in favor of theistically-orientedreligions must be read with
sufficient breadth to encompass unorthodox systems of belief in order to
avoid conflict with the constitutionalguarantees of religious freedom.
On March 8, 1965, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Seeger,'
added its voice to a dialogue which has endured between Congress and
the lower federal courts for the past twenty-five years. For the first
time, the Court undertook to construe a perpetually troublesome provision: the conscientious objector exemption from military service Questions of the scope of religious freedom are generally controversial and
the present problem is no exception. The opinion of the Court, while
purporting to be solely an examination of congressional intent, assumes
larger proportions.
It is obvious that an opposition to the taking of life may have many
roots. It can be founded on an interpretation of the Bible,' or it can be
founded on a belief in a Marxian-like interpretation of history 4 -the
spectrum is exceedingly wide and the degrees of difference often subtle.
Congress has drawn lines, and in doing so has raised questions of freedom
of religion. These will become apparent in the discussion of the preSeeger dialogue. The analysis of Seeger suggests some implications of
the resolution of this dialogue both in terms of the scope of the conscient Senior Fellow, Russell Sage Program in Law and the Social Sciences, Northwestern
University; B.S. 1960, J.D. 1963, Northwestern University; Member, Illinois Bar.
The author expresses his gratitude to Professor Victor G. Rosenblum, Northwestern University, for his encouragement and constructive criticism.
1 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
2 A number of cases have dealt with the question of whether such an exemption is required. See note 59 infra. However, the only previous case dealing with the terms of the
exemption itself gave the issue short shrift. In holding the 1917 act constitutional, in the
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), the Court said with respect to the conscientious-objector exemption therein (see text accompanying notes 5-6 infra):
And we pass without anything but statement [of] the proposition that an establishment
of a religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof repugnant to the First
Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of the act . . . because we think its
unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more.
Id. at 389-90.
3 See, e.g., Matthew 5:39-44 (Christ's Sermon on the Mount).
4 To one convinced of the historical inevitability of the fall of capitalism it might well
seem fundamentally wrong to be forced to go to war to defend the system.
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tious-objector limitation and in terms of the dynamics, generally, of
interpretation of the constitutional protections afforded freedom of religion. The ensuing discussion then considers the proposed broader doctrine
within the context of other cases both decided and undecided.
THE COURTS AND CONGRESS:

A DALOGUE

Conscientious objection to military service has a long and varied
history in this country, dating from prerevolutionary days, which will
not be detailed here.5 Suffice it to say that the exemption afforded to
religious objectors by the Selective Service Act of 1917 was the recognition of a long-standing concern for the interest involved. The 1917
act provided that:
[N] othing in this Act contained shall be construed to require or compel
any person to serve in any of the forces herein provided for who is found
to be a member of any well-recognized religious sect or organization at
present organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid
its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein in accordance with the creed
or principles of said religious organizations ..

..

Two characteristics of this provision are relevant to later considerations. First of all, it should be noted that the exemption is drawn in favor
of members of religious sects. Common sense suggests the rationale for
this limitation. If political objection to a particular war was an acceptable
basis for exemption, national security would become in large measure
a question of national consensus. The concern of government to provide
a protected area of nonparticipation is unrelated to individual political
disagreements with foreign policy; rather, the concern of government
in this area has traditionally been to secure the individual from the
dilemma of choosing between the demands of temporal power and those
derived from higher spiritual sources, "external" to the individual.
The second notable characteristic of the 1917 exemption is its limitation to pacifist religious sects. Two aspects of this limitation are worthy
of consideration. It should be apparent that religious opposition to war
is not necessarily synonymous with pacifism. Thus, the objector may
contend that his opposition is derived from a compelling faith that the
Biblical injunction, "What, therefore, God has joined together let no
5 For a discussion of the early history of concern for the conscientious objector, see
U.S. Selective Service System, Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection (1950); Conklin,
"Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins," 51 Geo.
LJ. 252 (1963); Russell, "Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the
United States," 20 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 409 (1952).
6 40 Stat. 78 (1917), repealed by 49 Stat. 878 (1935).
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man put asunder,"7 means that a married man shall not serve in the military.8 Or, he may claim that the defeat of Agog by Gog prophesized in
the Bible is imminent; that Gog is the United States and Agog the
Communist forces, and thus to go to war would offend the commands of
the Bible? Certainly, these are in one sense religious objections to war. 10
The point is that the traditional concern has been for the pacifist objector: the objector who feels a religious abhorrence for the taking of
life.
It may be protested, however, that such a belief is not synonymous
with membership in a pacifist sect. This brings to the forefront the
second aspect of the pacifist limitation: namely, administrative convenience. The problems involved in determining the scope of "religious"
opposition to war, as well as the sincerity of individual belief, need hardly
be mentioned. The attractive nature of establishing an "objective" test
thus was no doubt a crucial factor in establishing the limitation. 11 Its
basic unfairness, aside from constitutional questions, was early recognized, however, and by a directive of the Secretary of War the limitation
2
to pacifist sects was rejected in favor of a broader exemption.'
In 1940 the Selective Service Act was subjected to an intensive
reexamination. As originally conceived, section 7(d) of the BurkeWadsworth Bill would have substantially reenacted the exemption for
members of historic peace churches. In committee hearings, however,
it was strongly urged that minority elements of nonpacifist churches
interpreted the Biblical position on the taking of life in a manner in7 Matthew 19:6.

8 See Smith & Bell, "The Conscientious Objector Program-A Search for Sincerity,"
19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 695, 708 (1958).
9 Id. at 708-09.
10 The Jehovah's Witnesses' opposition to any but "theocratic wars" constitutes a
unique problem. This has been held not inconsistent with the requisite opposition to
"real shooting wars." Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
11 Secretary of War Newton D. Baker testified before the House Military Affairs Committee with respect to the exemption in the 1917 act. He stated, in part:
The religious-belief section is changed from that which you have in the National
Defense Act, and which, in my judgment, is inoperable. In the National Defense Act
you have an exclusion of any person who has conscientious beliefs against the bearing
of arms .... That, of course, makes the question of exclusion purely a question of individual statement, and as lawyers might say, of a self-serving declaration made after
the event. We recommend that the provision be modified so as to exclude or exempt
those who are actually members of a recognized society which has, as one of its tenets,
the disapproval of war.
Hearings on the Selective Service Act Before the House Committee on Military Affairs,
65th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1917). Cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
12 U.S. Dep't of War, Statement Concerning the Treatment of Conscientious Objectors
in the Army 39 (1919):
The Secretary of War directs that until further instructions on the subject are issued
"personal scruples against war" shall be considered as constituting "conscientious objection" and such persons should be treated in the same manner as other "conscientious
objectors . . ..
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distinguishable from the historic peace churches. 3 Thus there was strong
pressure to yield ground on administrative convenience ("objectivity")
in order to afford a more meaningful exemption for those theistically
opposed to war.14
The American Civil Liberties Union, taking an even stronger stand,
suggested that the 1917 act be amended so as to exempt those "conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."' 5 The Society
of Friends, instead, submitted a proposed amendment which exempted
the objector "who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."' 6 This latter
phrasing was incorporated into the bill which came out of committee and
was subsequently passed. Section 5(g) of the 1940 act provides:
Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to require any person to
be subject to combatant training and service in the land or naval forces of
the United States who, by reason of religious training and
belief, is con7
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.1
The key phrase, of course, is that which comprises the distinction
between the respective suggestions of the ACLU and Society of Friends:
"by reason of religious training and belief." Divergent interpretations
developed fairly rapidly in the Second and Ninth Circuits.
It could have been argued either way, from the record in United States
8
v. Kauten,1
as to whether the petitioner's opposition was "political" or
"religious." He seemed to believe generally in passive resistance. However, much of his protest was directed specifically at World War II and
the Roosevelt Administration. The Court upheld his conviction for failure
to submit to induction. But in construing section 5 (g) the Second Circuit
formulated a test perhaps more appropriate to the rejected ACLU provision:
[T]he provisions of the present statute ... take into account the charac.
teristics of a skeptical generation and make the existence of a conscientious
scruple against war in any form, rather than allegiance to a definite
religious group or creed, the basis of exemption. 19
In elaborating upon the distinction between opposition to a particular
Is See U.S. Selective Service System, supra note 5, ch. 4.
14 Note that even the 1917 act required personal agreement with the tenets of the pacifist
religious organization. Thus, theoretically at least, even that proviso was not "objective."
15 Hearings on H.R. 10132 Before the House Committee on Military Affairs, 73d Cong.,
3d Sess. 191 (1940).
16 Id. at 211.
17 54 Stat. 889 (1940), (expired March 31, 1947) (now see 62 Stat. 613 (1948), 50
U.S.C. Appendix § 456 (j) (1964), reproduced in text accompanying note 30 infra).
18 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
'9 Id. at 708.
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war and "a conscientious scruple against war in any form," the court
said:
The former is usually a political opposition while the latter, we think, may
justly be regarded as a response of the individual to an inward mentor, call
it conscience or God, that is for many persons at the present time the
equivalent of what has always been thought a religious impulse2 0 [Emphasis added.]
This language was, of course, dicta since petitioner Kauten failed to
meet even this "liberal" test of exemption. However, the doctrine took
on real meaning in later Second Circuit cases. In United States ex rel.
Phillips v. Downer,21 the petitioner sought objector status on the basis
of his belief that "war is ethically and inevitably wrong." He remembered
various church teachings but had also read extensively in social philosophy and history from "Plato to Shaw." He asserted:
But from whom I derived my opposition to killing men-which I judge to
be the objective of "combatant military service"--I
22 cannot specifically say.
Yet the fact remains that I have this opposition.
Held, petitioner's objection was "religious" rather than "political"
within the Kauten dichotomy.
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt,23 petitioner based his
beliefs on readings of history and other studies while in school. The court
definitively stated its test, derived from Kauten, in granting petitioner's
claim:
The relator can only secure exemption if it is found that the Director of
Selective Service has held that he objected to "participation in any war
under any
circumstances because of the compelling voice of his con24
science."
The Second Circuit view was rejected, however, by the Ninth Circuit.
In Berman v. United States25 the petitioner entered no claim of belief in
God but offered considerable uncontested evidence to the effect that he
held a sincere humanitarian belief that it was improper to wage war. The
court held that there must be some manifestation of relationship to a
supreme power distinct from and above human reason to come within
the statute. Construing section 5(g), it quoted Chief Justice Hughes
dissenting in United States v. Maclntosh2 to the effect that "the essence
20
21
22
23

Ibid.
135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
Id. at 523.
141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944).
24 Id. at 848.
2S 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
28 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931).
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of religion is belief in a relation to 27God involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation.)
The conflict was seemingly resolved by Congress. In 1948, section 5 (g)
was amended to include a definiton of "religious training and belief"
worded substantially in the terms of Chief Justice Hughes:
Religious -training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. 28
The Senate Report on the new provision cited, in explanation, Berman
v. United States.29 Thus had Congress seemingly closed the argument.
But issue was soon drawn once more by conflict between the Second
and Ninth Circuits. The former court, however, now made it clear that
more than an ambiguity as to congressional intent was in question. For
the first time questions of constitutional protection of religious freedom
were explicitly discussed and decided contrary to the congressional enactment: the new section, 6(j), was declared unconstitutional by the Second
Circuit.
In United States v. Jakobson, 0 the petitioner alleged that he came
within the statutory language of section 6 (j). He recognized an ultimate
cause, which he called "Godness," but which could not be realized through
any personal one-to-one "vertical" relationship in the traditional sense.
Rather, it called for a "horizontal" relationship to one's fellow man:
The way to arrive closer to Godness is by approaching the universals inherent in existence. The individual must deal with life, death, health, love,
time-the "givens" of existence stemming
from the Ultimate Cause-as
31
he finds them in himself and others.
This view makes human existence holy-infused with Godness-and
renders the taking of life sinful."
The court seemed to recognize that section 6(j) was intended to "beef
up" Kauten, and that Berman envisioned a one-to-one vertical relation27 Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795
(1946).
28 62 Stat. 613 (1948), 50 U.S.C. Appendix § 456(j) (1964).
29 S. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). The report is as follows:
This section re-enacts substantially the same provisions as were found in sub-section
5(g) of the 1940 act. Exemption extends to anyone who, because of religious training
and belief in his relationship to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously opposed to combatant military service or to both combatant and noncombatant military service (see
United States v. Berman, 156 F.2d 377, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795).
80 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), rev'd, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
31 Id. at 413.
32 It should be understood that "sinful" in this context has no connotation of super-

natural sanction. It becomes, rather, a question of being untrue to oneself and the meaning
one attaches to existence.
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ship. However, the court declared that such a rigid interpretation would
conflict with Torcaso v. Watkins" (to be discussed later) and require
the invalidation of the statute on constitutional grounds. Thus to avoid
the constitutional question the statute was read broadly enough to cover
petitioner Jakobson. Kauten and
its progeny were thus resurrected.
" In United States v. Seeger,'4 however,
the same court faced the constitutional question squarely. In Jakobson, the petitioner had claimed the
protection of section 6(j). Petitioner Seeger instead chose to attack
section 6(j) outright3 He did not argue that section 6(j) applied to
him. Rather, he argued its unconstitutionality on numerous grounds. 6
Although it was stipulated that Seeger's objection was "religious," the
district court found him guilty of wrongfully failing to submit to induction. His unwillingness to answer in the affirmative the question on the
conscientious objector form as to his belief in a Supreme Being was
7
deemed sufficient for denial of his claim.
The Second Circuit reversed. 8 Petitioner had contended that:
Skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God does not necessarily mean
lack of faith in anything whatsoever ...Such personages as Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza evolved comprehensive ethical systems of intellectual
and moral integrity without belief in God, except in the remotest sense.39
Rejecting dependence upon the guidance of a Creator, Seeger maintained
"more respect for.., belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for
their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed."4 0
The court held it a deprivation of due process, under the fifth amendment, to classify on the basis of religion if such classification discriminated
among religions. And the classification here discriminated between theistic
and nontheistic religions. Violation of the first amendment, although
alleged, was not discussed by the court.
The Ninth Circuit case of Peter v. United States,4 decided one month
33 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
34 216 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 380
U.S. 163 (1965).
35 It should be noted that the Seeger case was argued before the Jakobson case was decided. Thus, the broad construction of the statute in the latter case had not yet been

announced.
36 Petitioner contended that the statute conflicted with: (1) the due process clause of
the fifth amendment; (2) the free exercise clause of the first amendment; and (3) article

VI, § 3 (no religious test for United States office).

In response to the query as to the petitioner's belief in a Supreme Being, he answered:
Of course, the existence of God cannot be proven or disproven, and the essence of his
nature cannot be determined. I prefer to admit this and leave the question open rather
than answer "yes" or "no" ....
United States v. Seeger, 216 F. Supp. 516 (SD.N.Y. 1963).
8 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
89 Id. at 848.
87

40

Ibid.

41

324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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prior to Jakobson, cannot reasonably be distinguished on its facts from
the two Second Circuit cases. Petitioner contended that his views came
within section 6(j). At his trial he stated:
I think my actions are probably motivated most thoroughly by a feeling
of relationship and love towards other human beings and other living
objects in the world, and in seeing these other living objects. I can narrow
it down closer; I can define it as a belief in the mystery of the heart of
them, the essence of being alive, and my respecting and loving this livingness
in other objects and human beings.2
The Ninth Circuit held that the appeals board had not been unreasonable in deciding that these beliefs did not constitute belief in a Supreme
Being, as opposed to a personal moral code, as required by statute.
It would be erroneous to suggest that the courts had now come full
circle back to the Kauten-Berman controversy which led to the congressional action of 1948. At that earlier date, the Supreme Court could
remain silent in anticipation of a Congressional response to the conflict4
But, the Second Circuit had forced the issue in Seeger. For now it was
no longer a question of the breadth of the exemption-upon which
divergent views could, however reluctantly, be tolerated, even if congressional action was not forthcoming. In declaring 6(j) unconstitutional
in Seeger, the Second Circuit provided the prospect of no exemption in
that jurisdiction: presumably there could no longer be any claim of conscientious objector status in that circuit. If an issue were ever ripe for
Supreme Court adjudication, it was in the present series of cases, and
the Court accordingly granted certiorari, consolidating the three cases.
The Supreme Court entered the dialogue on March 8, 1965."' Taking
the lead of the Second Circuit in Jakobson, it construed section 6(j)
broadly so as to avoid the constitutional attack under the first amendment. The test of belief in a "Supreme Being," within the statutory
language, was held to be:
A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor
a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying
for the exemption . . . .r
42 Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173, 176-77 (9th Cir. 1963). Further, petitioner
stated:
Since human life is for me a final value, I consider it a violation of moral law to take
human life. I think I have reached this conclusion out of my reading of such writing
as those of Blake (Christian mystic), Emerson, Whitman, and more modem poets
who have touched on the question.
I consider this belief to be superior to my obligation to the state.
Id. at 174 n.2.
43 Cf. discussion of "ripeness" in Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 143-56 (1962).
44 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
45 Id. at 176.
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Under this test the claimed exemptions of each of the three petitioners
was upheld.
There is a touch of irony to the case. Protest is common with regard
to the poor craftsmanship of the present Court.46 This alleged denigration
of workman-like standards is almost inevitably tied in with a declamation
of the "activism" of the Court: in fact, the two claims are often inseparable. Seeger, however, is a difficult case for the joint admirer of
craftsmanship and judicial passivism: craftsmanship would have led to
a lack of deference-section 6(j) would have been declared unconstitutional. Much was sacrificed to avoid this result.
The Court struggled mightily to read the 1948 amendment as other
than a limitation of the exemption. It was properly pointed out that
Congress intended to reenact "substantially" the same provision it had
included in the 1940 act.47 If that enactment was not entirely unambiguous, the rejection of the ACLU suggestion which omitted the "religious training and belief" proviso, the prior history of the scope of the
exemption, and the specific reference to Berman in the 1948 amendment
certainly suggest strongly that only "vertical" objectors, to use petitioner Jakobson's phrase, were intended. 4 8
The Court attempted to explain the congressional citation of Berman
by reconciling Kauten with Berman:
For both Kauten and Berman hold in common the conclusion that exemption must be denied to those whose beliefs are political, social, or philosophical in nature, rather than religious. Both, in fact denied exemption
on that very ground.4 9
To thus merge Kauten and Berman under a single principle consonant
with section 6(j) is little more than to say that in both cases the exemptions were denied. For any distinction between "philosophical belief" and
a "personal moral code," on the one hand, and "religious belief," on the
other, loses all meaning under the principle of KautenY° This becomes
46 See, e.g., Kurland, "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143 (1964).
47 United States v. Seeger, supra note 44, at 176; S. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1948). The Court reads "substantially the same provision" as though it means "the pro-

vision as interpreted by Kauten." This seems wholly unwarranted. A more logical reading
of this phrase would be that it, in effect, says that Kauten had misinterpreted the 1940 act
and therefore -the clause was being reenacted with a clearer expression of what had been
intended.
48 The Court points out that the term "Supreme Being" is substituted for "God" in
the statutory subscription to the language of the Berman case. This, it is suggested by
the Court, indicates an intention broader than that of the Ninth Circuit decision. These
terms are not words of art. If Congress had intended this subtle change of meaning it
would certainly have been easier to cite Kauten instead of Berman than simply to leave
the matter open to speculation by substituting one imprecise term for another.
49 United States v. Seeger, supra note 44, at 178.
50 See quotes at text to notes 19-20 supra.
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2 the cases following Kauten
abundantly clear in Badt5l and Downer,"
and allowing the exemption. These cases are entirely ignored by the
Court's opinion.
Interestingly, the Court commences its interpretation of section 6(j)
by stating:
The section excludes those persons who, disavowing religious belief, decide
on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations
that war is wrong and that they will have no part in it.53 [Emphasis added.]

Note that the Court restated the language of section 6(j) so that
"economic" objection is substituted for "philosophical"-perhaps an
indication of the discomfort with the dichotomy as applied to the
present case. Simply stated, it is impossible to draw a rational distinction between religious belief and personal moral code or philosophy which
covers the petitioners' beliefs54 and still grant them exemption. 5
SOME PERSPECTIVES ON THE DECISION
The tortuous and strained reasoning of the Court was, it is suggested,
its only alternative to holding section 6(j) unconstitutional. Justice
Douglas opens his concurring opinion with the following remarks:
If I read the statute differently from the Court, I would have difficulties.
For then those who embraced one religious faith rather than another would
be subject to penalties; and that kind of discrimination .. .would violate

the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.5 6
Implicitly the opinion of the Court says as much. Complete invalidation of the objector exemption is the only alternative to the present
construction.
Man, a reflective creature, forms a conceptual understanding of his
relationship to the external phenomenological universe. It may or may
not be a substantial guide to his everyday actions, but it is the sphere of
belief which, in broadest principle, the free exercise clause was meant
51 Consider again the petitioner's claim for exemption, discussed at text following note
23 supra.
52 Consider again the petitioner's claim for exemption, discussed at text following note
21 supra.
53 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173 (1965).
54 Consider again the petitioner's claims for exemption, discussed at text to notes 30-42
supra.
55 The Court quotes with favor from Paul Tillich:
And if that word (God) has not much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of the
depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, "of what
you take seriously without any reservation." Perhaps, in order to do so, you must
forget everything traditional that you have learned about God .... [Quotation marks
added for emphasis.]
United States v. Seeger, supra note 53, at 187, quoting Tillich, The Shaking Foundations
57 (1948).
56 Id. at 188. justice Douglas alone concurred separately. There were no dissents.
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to protect. The heart of the principle expressed by the clause is that state
authority shall not discriminate against a man because of the particular
manner in which this belief manifests itself in his cognitive system. To
limit the resultant freedom to any combination of beliefs is simply a
contradiction in terms.
A distinction must be drawn here between restrictions on one's tenets
of belief and restrictions on one's system of belief. From an early date,
it has been recognized that where tenets of belief conflict with an important societal value the former may necessarily have to be limited:
freedom from restriction is not in this sense absolute.s7 However, where
the restriction is directed at one's system of belief it is an entirely different matter and, it is suggested, an absolute protection is proper. It is
one thing to validate a legislative judgment that the requirements of
national security are sufficiently vital to justify a conscientious objection
only if it is on the basis of an opposition to the taking of life; 58 it is quite
another matter to draw the limitation in terms of the ontological basis
for the opposition to the taking of life. The legislative judgment, in the
latter case, is predicated upon just that presumption which the free
exercise clause is meant to deny: that one view of man's relationship to
the universe is more desirable than another.
It is suggested, then, that it was these constitutional considerations
which led the Court to construe the statute in the chosen manner. Certainly the wording of the Court-established test for granting the exemption-whether the claimant asserts a "belief which occupies in the life
of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of admittedly
qualified objectors"-seems consistent with these suggestions.
Whether the dialogue will continue is, of course, now in the hands of
Congress. Three possible courses of action are possible. (1) If dissatisfied with Seeger, and out of patience with the courts, Congress could
abolish the exemption altogether. It seems quite certain that this would
raise no constitutional problems. 9 On the other hand, it would raise
57

See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

58 See discussion in text accompanying and preceding note 10 supra.

59 The question of whether "any" exemption for conscientious objectors is constitutionally compelled raises quite different problems from the question of whether a "particular"
exemption offends the first amendment. A number of cases have indirectly considered the
former question and uniformly answered in the negative. Petitions for naturalization were
denied in both United States v. Schwimner, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), and United States v.
MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 589 (1931), because the petitioners refused to give an unqualified
affirmation of their willingness to bear arms for the country. In both cases it was assumed
that the granting of any exemption was strictly an exercise of congressional discretion.
See also United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931). Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S.
61 (1946), overruled these cases, but only on the question of statutory interpretation. It
was held that, in the absence of clear congressional intent, it should not be assumed that a
willingness to bear arms was a prerequisite to taking the oath to support the Constitution.
Subsequently Congress provided for the alien conscientious objector petitioning for citizen-
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considerable political opposition, and must be assessed as highly unlikely.60 (2) If dissatisfied with Seeger, Congress could limit the exemption to those who oppose military service on the basis of their belief
in a traditional concept of God--clearly spelling out the "vertical"
nature of the limitation, and expressly rejecting Seeger. This would force
the constitutional question and, as suggested above, would almost certainly lead to judicial invalidation of the objector proviso. Thus, in fact,
the only alternative to Seeger is no exemption. (3) If satisfied with
Seeger, Congress can simply let it stand. This seems most likely. Political
opposition to the case will undoubtedly be de minimis. It is highly unlikely that the new standard will significantly raise the number of
exemptions. 61 And, finally, the administrative difficulties involved are
probably highly exaggerated. 62 On the latter score it should be remembered that "religious training and belief," even in the Berman sense,
required neither formal church membership nor informal affiliation.
How broad is the exemption now? The Court said that:
No party claims to be an atheist or attacks the statute on this ground.
The question is not, therefore, one between theistic and atheistic beliefs.
We do not deal with or intimate any decision on that situation in these
cases.0 3
And, Justice Douglas, concurring, asserted that if petitioner were an
atheist "a quite different problem would be presented,"6 4 citing Torcaso
v. Watkins.6 5 It may be suggested that if petitioner were an "atheist"
ship in language parallel to § 6(j). See 66 Stat. 258 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (5) (1964).
In Hamilton v. Regents of University, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), petitioner was denied exemption from compulsory classes in military training at the University of California. He
claimed that such denial infringed upon his rights of conscience. The Court held that the
University policy was proper, emphasizing that the conscientious-objector provision is a
matter of legislative grace and not constitutionally required. A fortiori, a school might require classes in military training.
In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945), concerned a petitioner who was denied admission
to the Bar on the basis of his unwillingness to bear arms. The Court affirmed, citing
Schwimmer, MacIntosh, and Hamilton as precedent for the propriety of an absolute requirement of military service.
60 Every denomination is anxious to protect this right of conscience, if only for its
minority members. And, of course, libertarian organizations favor it.
61 In re Summers, supra note 59, wherein the petitioner was denied admission to the
Bar on the basis of his conscientious objection to war, is perhaps an extreme example of a
very real phenomenon: strong social disapproval of the conscientious objector. Cf. United
States v. Schwimmer, supra note 59; United States v. Maclntosh, supra note 59. Although
not directly relevant to the argument it is interesting to note that the estimated number
of conscientious objector claims during World War I was less than one-half of 1% of the
group liable for military service during that period.
62 The Selective Service System has the assistance of the FBI and the justice Department for purposes of investigating the petitioner. Query, in any event, whether the sincerity of an exemption claim based on humanitarian beliefs is any more difficult to ascertain than an exemption claim based on a "personal" interpretation of the will of a traditional
God.
65 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173-74 (1965).
64 Id. at 193 n.2.
65 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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quite the same problems would be presented and, in fact, the answers
have been settled by Seeger. The term "atheist" which is in itself hopelessly vague, is totally irrelevant after Seeger.
It has been suggested above that Seeger, despite its purported reliance
on statutory construction, is in reality a recognition that the free exercise
clause, in the broadest interpretation of principle, tolerates no distinctions among systems of belief. The opinion raises, and settles, the question: why should the man whose "religion" is grounded on a belief in a
mystical and brotherly "goodness" as an essence in the soul of every
man be less free to maintain his system of belief than the man believing
in a more traditional concept of God? Surely the principle of religious
freedom embodied in the first amendment is broad enough to protect
both. Torcaso v. Watkins6 6 is merely an extension of this principle. In
Torcaso, petitioner was denied certification as a notary public on the
basis of his refusal to comply with the statutory requirement that he
affirm his belief in the existence of God. The Court found the statute
in conffict with the protection afforded petitioner by the first amendment.
In an oft-quoted phrase, the Court asserted:
Neither [state nor federal government] can constitutionally pass laws or
impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and
neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the
existence of God as
67
against those religions founded on a different belief.
This is one of innumerable instances of vagaries resulting from the
unwillingness of the Court to clearly define-or even explicitly recognize-the relationship between the establishment and free exercise
clauses.6" It is quite beside the point that the oath requirement in
Torcaso might have had some highly improbable and oblique tendency
to "aid all religions." Surely the heart of the matter is the burden on
petitioner Torcaso, rather than some highly speculative benefit. And, in
this connection, it is equally confusing to characterize Torcaso in terms
of protection of the "atheist," whatever that term may mean.
The crucial point is that petitioner Torcaso was discriminated against
because he refused to affirm a belief in God-nowhere does the opinion
of the Court refer to him as an "atheist"--and the necessity of such affirmance could be inconsistent with any number of "religious" stances
66 Ibid.
67 Id. at 495.
68 See the protest, on this score, of Justice Stewart, concurring in Sherbert v. Verner,

374 U.S. 398, 413-17 (1963). Although perhaps less obvious in that case than Justice
Stewart would lead one to believe, the problem is often most perplexing. See, e.g., Reed v.
Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965). See generally Katz, 'Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality," 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 426 (1953); Kurland, "Of Church and
State and the Supreme Court," 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1961).
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protected by a liberal reading of the first amendment. 9 Torcaso may
have adhered to a system of belief synonymous with that of Seeger, or
Peter, or Jakobson-any one of which would have been consistent with
his refusal to take the oath. If so, the question is again: what basis is
there, consistent with the first amendment, for burdening such a system
of belief?
If Torcaso, then, offers no added assistance in assessing the protection
of the "atheistic" conscientious objector, this is not to say that no
assistance exists. Seeger itself offers the answer.
What is an "atheist"? In most cases the thoughtful skeptic will base
his lack of belief on the absence of proof or evidence of a God. Ordinarily
such a person will readily admit that he has no "absolute proof" that
there is no God. Thus, to be consistent, he must substantially echo the
assertion of petitioner Seeger-that the question is unanswerable even
if it appears most probable that there is no Deity. The question then
becomes one of his particular system of belief and the local board is
faced with one of the infinite variations exemplified by the petitioners
in Seeger. Thus, unless the Court had in mind someone who adamantly
refuses to admit the possibility of a Deity, it set aside for future deliberation an imaginary question.
And what of the militant absolute disbeliever? Either he adheres to
one of the variations on the theme of universal, humanistic Goodness
or else his views are such that he cannot qualify for exemption in any
event. In other words, unless he professes the sort of venerating attitude
toward human life which sounds like a "Supreme Being" as now defined,
he does not qualify for the statutory exemption afforded those who are
conscientiously opposed to the taking of life, and if he does adhere to
such a system of belief he, ipso facto, is not an "atheist." Thus, for
purposes of conscientious objection, there is but one necessary and sufficient condition: a fundamentally based opposition to the taking of life.
Absolute vertical disbelief in the traditional sense--disbelief in God-is
irrelevant.

SOME BROADER IMPLICATIONS
Two broader questions follow from the discussion which, up to this
point, has largely centered around the military conscientious objector
exemption. It was suggested earlier that an absolute protection against
discriminations among systems of belief is most consonant with the
principle of the free exercise clause. This view must be examined in
69 The state court similarly characterized the case in terms of unwillingness to affirm,
rather than atheism. Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49, 162 A.2d 438 (1960).
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greater detail. Also, the general problem of "disbelief" and its relationship
to the first amendment guarantee will be considered.
1. DiscriminationAmong Systems of Belief
The test for exemption suggested in the Seeger opinion is almost
exactly that which was applied in the California case of Fellowship of
Humanity v. County of Alameda.1 0 That case and Washington Ethical
Society v. Districtof Columbia1 both concerned statutes which provided
tax exemptions for buildings used for "religious worship." The question
in each was whether the petitioner qualified for the exemption, considering the activities for which each used its facilities. In both cases, the
activities were essentially "humanistic"-an exploration of the nature of
man, his diverse activities and interests, his quest for unity and something more than merely himself. Neither group, however, insisted upon
or formally recognized the existence of any form of deity or Supreme
Being.
In both cases the exemptions were granted. In the Ethical Society case
the rationale was vague and formalistic. The California court, on the other
hand, formulated the following test:
[T]he only inquiry in such a case is the objective one of whether or not
the belief occupies the same place in the lives of its holders that the
orthodox beliefs occupy in the lives of believing majorities, and whether a
given group that claims the exemption conducts itself the way groups
conceded to be religious conduct themselves. 72
Such a test follows logically from a view of religious freedom expansive
enough to recognize that the individual system of belief-call it religion,
philosophy, or personal moral code-is entitled to the same protection
as traditional religious belief. The court went on to say that:
[R] eligion fills a void that exists in the lives of most men. Regardless of
why a particular belief suffices, as long as it serves this purpose,
it must be
73
accorded the same status of an orthodox religious belief.
Is every potential classification among systems of belief now either
necessarily subject to construction in line with the California-Seeger test
or else unconstitutional?
The Maryland Code, which provided for the affirmation of belief in
God held unconstitutional in Torcaso, also provides:
153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
71 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
72 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, supra note 70, at 692, 315 P.2d
at 406. Questions of abridgment of religious freedom under the state constitution were
raised in the case, but the court was addressing itself to the first amendment in suggesting the present test.
78 Id. at 692-93, 315 P.2d at 406.
70
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[N]or shall any person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a
witness, or juror, on account of his religious belief; provided he believes in
the existence of God, and that under His dispensation such person will be
or punished thereheld morally accountable for his acts and be rewarded
74
fore either in this world or the world to come.
The rationale for this provision is, of course, evident in its final clause.
However, similar arguments on the alleged rational purpose of a requirement of external "vertical" belief in Seeger and Torcaso were to no
avail.7 5 The infirmity in each of these cases is that the argument for
upholding the statute rests on a rationale which is directly contrary to
the asserted principle of first-amendment protection. In other words,
any distinction suggested on the basis of system of belief per se must
contend that there is intrinsic merit in some systems which is not present
in others.
It is this factor which distinguishes this line of cases from the long
line of Jehovah Witnesses' cases, 6 the Sunday-closing-law cases,7 7 and
Skerbert v. Verner71 among others. These latter cases require a balancing
process involving a secularly based statute with a secular rationale which,
unfortunately, places burdens upon religious freedom, to a greater or
lesser extent.
Thus in Sherbert v. Verner-which upheld the claims of petitioner to
first-amendment protection-a Seventh Day Adventist protested the
refusal of the state to pay her unemployment compensation because of
a statutory requirement that she be "available for work." She refused
to accept Saturday employment on the basis of her sabbatarian practice.
The unsuccessful argument for upholding the statute as applied to her
was: (1) "availability for work" is a reasonable qualification for the
benefits, and (2) an exception in favor of religious objectors would be
administratively unmanageable.
It is certainly arguable whether Sherbert,where the petitioner received
the benefit of first-amendment protection, is distinguishable from the
Sunday-closing-law cases, where the secular purpose of the statute
was upheld.79 And, the expression of an all-encompassing rationale for
74 Md. Const., Declaration of Rights, art. 36 (1957).
75 It can be argued in favor of a "Supreme Being" limitation, in the traditional sense,
that only higher external commands create a degree of conflict in the individual so serious
that state authority should be curtailed. It can be argued in favor of the requirement
that a notary public affirm a belief in God that the nature of the office-attesting oathsrequires an individual to whom the oath is supernaturally endowed.
76 For a discussion of these cases, see Kurland, supra note 68, at 36-62.
77 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961),; Two Guys from
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.. 582 (1961).
78 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
79'See

id. at 417-18 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 421 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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the Jehovah Witnesses cases is no mean feat.8 0 The task is clear however:
the secular purpose-be it public safety, public rest, public peace and
quiet-must be balanced against the burden placed upon the tenets of
religious belief by the statutory proscription.
Seeger and related cases, however, are of a different nature. The
rationale for section 6(j) is neither freedom of conscience, which suggests the desirability of some exemption, nor the national security,
which suggests some limitation on the exemption. It is rather, a legislative judgment that for purposes of exemption certain systems of belief
are by their very nature superior to others. Torcaso and the tax
exemption cases involve the same issue. The constitutional infirmity in
these cases-unless the statute is to be read broadly to avoid the problem-is such that no balancing test is required."'
2. Disbelief
The question of first-amendment protection for the "atheist" can best
be clarified by returning for a moment to consideration of the military
conscientious objector. Consider the possibility that Congress enacted
a provision excluding "atheists" from the protection of section 6(j) as
now construed. It follows from the earlier discussion that the constitutional question would never be reached. Either the petitioning "atheist"
would not qualify in any event for the exemption because his beliefs fell
outside the purview of those exhibiting the requisite opposition to the
taking of life (petitioner Kauten, for example), or the petitioner would
qualify for exemption because of the necessarily limited construction of
"atheist" if that provision is to be read consistently with section 6(j).
The new section would thus be superfluous.
The broader implications herein can be illustrated by considering another example. A suggested amendment, later rejected, to the unfair
80 See, e.g., Kurland, Religion and the Law: Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court 50-74 (1962).
81 A recent case illustrates the same problem in a different context. In Kolbeck v.
Kramer, 84 N.J. Super. 569, 202 A.2d 889 (Super. Ct. L. 1964), plaintiff sought admission
at Rutgers, the State University. A state statute provided that any student might be excluded who refused to be vaccinated except "if the proposed vaccination interferes with
the free exercise of his religious principles." The University excepted Christian Scientists
under this provision but refused to except plaintiff, whose view was based upon a family
personal belief "that it was God's Word or belief in God which would keep them healthy."
He was refused admittance. The court compelled his admission. The statutory compulsion with respect to vaccination could have been absolute but it was not, and since it
was not it could not be applied so as to discriminate between religious beliefs. It was so
applied in the present case, held the court, because the plaintiff was denied coverage solely
on the ground that he was not a Christian Scientist.
The action of the University in the present case is an interesting example of the real
significance of the constitutional protection involved. In denying the plaintiff admission to
the University, they gave him a certificate to have filled out by the Christian Science Church
attesting to the fact that he was a member in good standing of that Church.
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employment practices section of the Civil Rights Act would have provided that: "It shall not be unlawful employment for an employer to
refuse to hire . . . because of said person's atheistic practices and

beliefs."
Assume that an employer were to use the provision as a defense against
an alleged unfair employment practice claim of a prospective employee.
The employee further alleges the unconstitutionality of the proviso as
infringing the protection afforded him by the first amendment.2 A final
assumption will make the problem clear: assume further that the aggrieved employee adheres to the same system of belief as petitioner
Seeger. Are such beliefs constitutionally protected from discrimination
in the granting of a military exemption but statutorily subjected to the
possibility of discrimination in obtaining employment? This would
certainly be a tortured application of the broad principle of protection
of free exercise suggested. And, what justification could there be for it?8
The suggestion is, quite simply, that any classification in terms of
"atheists" is devoid of meaning.8 4
In order to protect unorthodox systems of belief it is necessary to
reject the traditional definition of "atheist" as one who does not believe
in God. 5 But this raises unanswerable questions: If the suggested unfair
employment practices amendment did not mean that the employer could
refuse to hire someone who did not believe in God, what does it mean?
What more closely restricted class would bear any reasonable relationship to an employer's hiring practices? The statute, in effect, would be
a nullity because the term "atheist" has lost its meaning.
In general, then, it is suggested that the traditional definition of the
term "atheist" is inconsistent with the protection afforded systems of
belief under the expanding interpretation of the free exercise clause.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Seeger is an example of a hard case making good law but paying a
high price in judicial craftsmanship. An explanatory factor is the peculiar
82 Torcaso would, of course, present the same problems if the statute were phrased in
terms of exclusion of "atheists" from office.
83 Note that the naturalization provisions, which for many years presented just such a
disparity (see note 59 supra), are now worded such that the necessity of taking an oath to
bear arms in defense of the country is conditioned in the same manner as the compulsion to
serve in the armed forces. 66 Stat. 258 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (5) (1964); see In re
Hansen, 148 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 1957); cf. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
84 Cf. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), where it was held that oath requirements
applied to state employees relating to loyalty to government and government institutions, and
to subversive activities, were unconstitutionally vague-offensive to due process.
85 Webster defines atheism as "a disbelief in the existence of God or any other deity."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961).
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context in which Seeger arose. Tie general problem of classifications
among systems of belief arises only when a society has acquired a
relatively high degree of tolerance and sophistication. In the past,
tolerance has too often been circumscribed in terms of "God," "religion,"
"Supreme Being"--terms easily susceptible to interpretation so as to
substantially qualify the "toleration" they imply. Thus, statute and
judicial decision offer long-standing precedent contra to the principle
embodied in Seeger, Torcaso, and like cases.
Seeger offers a necessary guarantee: that the individual's system of
belief will be subjected to no value-oriented order of priorities vis-h-vis
other systems of belief. The fact that this viewpoint may be foreign to
the "religious" notions of the founding fathers is irrelevant to a liberal
view of the principle which they established: that every man's moral
conceptualization of existential phenomena is entitled to the same respect
from state authority.

